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FAQs
Mercantilist and Realist Perspectives on the Global Political Economy? ›
Mercantilism and realism would appear to go hand in glove with each other. If realism represents both a systemic worldview and explanatory model for world politics, then mercantilism would appear to be the paradigm's default foreign economic policy doctrine.
What is the mercantilist perspective of political economy? ›Mercantilism is economic nationalism for the purpose of building a wealthy and powerful state. Adam Smith coined the term “mercantile system” to describe the system of political economy that sought to enrich the country by restraining imports and encouraging exports.
What is a realist perspective on international political economy? ›Realists believe that there is no centralized global authority that limits sovereign states and determines their actions. For this reason, nation-states are the only legitimate actors in international affairs and neither supranational nor domestic actors can restrict them.
How does mercantilism relate to the global economy? ›Mercantilists believed that promoting exports would help a nation achieve a favorable balance of trade: if a country exported more than it imported, then it would be receiving more in payments (for the goods it exported) than it paid (for ones it imported).
What is a realist view of economic globalization? ›Realists believe that globalisation is not necessarily positive and can be used by more powerful states to manipulate weaker states for their self-interests. The main principles of realism are that states are the main actors on the international stage and are led by humans who are naturally selfish and power-hungry.
What were the principles of mercantilism and what impact did it have on economics and politics? ›Mercantilism is an economic practice by which governments used their economies to augment state power at the expense of other countries. Governments sought to ensure that exports exceeded imports and to accumulate wealth in the form of bullion (mostly gold and silver).
What are the perspectives of mercantilism? ›Mercantilism was based on the idea that a nation's wealth and power were best served by increasing exports and reducing imports. It's characterized by the belief that global wealth was static and that a nation's economic health relied heavily on its supply of capital.
How do realists see global politics? ›Realism, a school of thought in international relations theory, is a theoretical framework that views world politics as an enduring competition among self-interested states vying for power and positioning within an anarchic global system devoid of a centralized authority.
What are the three main perspectives on international political economy? ›The three dominant perspectives of IPE are economic liberalism, mercantilism, and structuralism. Each focuses on the relationships between a variety of actors and in- stitutions.
What is a realist perspective on economics? ›A realistic economics may take as some of its empirical content the institutions of an economy. In neo-classical economics, in contradistinction, it is the choices of individuals that constitute the empirical content of theory.
How did the policy of mercantilism affect global economies? ›
Mercantilism led to the creation of monopolistic trading companies, such as the East India Company and the French East India Company. Restrictions on where finished goods could be purchased led in many cases to burdensome high prices for those goods.
What are the main economic ideas of mercantilism? ›Mercantilism is a nationalist economic policy that is designed to maximize the exports and minimize the imports for an economy. In other words, it seeks to maximize the accumulation of resources within the country and use those resources for one-sided trade.
What was the main economic goal of mercantilism? ›The mercantilist goal was to maximize a nation's export surplus—the balance of trade, which was equated with the future prosperity and power of the realm—and the means were cheap production inputs, that is, cheap raw materials (for which colonies proved useful) and cheap, and therefore poor, labor at home.
What does a realist view of international economic relations believe? ›The first assumption of realism is that the nation-state (usually abbreviated to 'state') is the principle actor in international relations. Other bodies exist, such as individuals and organisations, but their power is limited. Second, the state is a unitary actor.
What is the realist view on global governance? ›Realism advocates that global governance is merely a tool for major world powers to maintain the divide between the least and most powerful states.
What is realistic economy? ›What is the Real Economy? The real economy refers to all real or non-financial elements of an economy. An economy can be solely described using just real variables. A barter economy is an example of an economy with no financial elements. All goods and services are purely represented in real terms.
What is the meaning of mercantilist economy? ›an economic theory developed in the 16th to 18th centuries that says that a government should control the economy and that a nation should increase its wealth by selling more than it buys from other nations.
What is the political philosophy of mercantilism? ›As commonly stated, mercantilist thought supported a policy position that countries should attempt to achieve trade surpluses that result in an inflow of “precious metals” or gold. In some renderings, this inflow of gold was seen as supporting royal treasuries.
What is the mercantilist view of the role of the government? ›As an economic theory, mercantilism relies on government intervention to regulate international trade and protect domestic industries. Mercantilist policies involve the protection of domestic corporations through regulations and the promotion of trade surpluses.